

# Picking Patients for Profit: Admissions Discrimination in Nursing Homes

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# About Me

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- Health economist
- Research:
  - Admissions discrimination
  - Nursing home workforce
  - Nursing home finance
  - COVID-19
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# What I'm Going to Tell You

- Admissions discrimination is **widespread**.
  - 19% of residents (40% of days) aren't at their first-choice nursing home
  - Beds are available, *just not available to them*.
- Evidence consistent with discrimination on Medicaid, stay length, disability, and race.
- Policy solutions aren't obvious.
  - Unintended consequences and ineffective

# Access Matters

- Large variation in whether facilities had COVID-19 outbreaks.
  - Many contributing factors such as size, location, staffing, etc.
  - Access to a smaller facility, a better-resourced facility, or a better-located facility could reduce your risk dramatically.
- Important long before COVID
  - 1% less staff -> +1.9% mortality (.15 pp)
    - Friedrich and Hackmann (2021)

# Disability Discrimination

**Disclaimer:** I am not a lawyer.

- Disability discrimination is **clearly illegal**
  - Rehabilitation Act
  - American with Disabilities Act
  - Fair Housing Act
- Example: Wagner v. Fair Acres
- Exception: if care cannot be provided.
  - Grubbs v. Medical Facilities of America

# Medicaid Discrimination

Clear **intention** to ban it (1987 NHRA):

*"Not request or require residents or potential residents to waive their rights... including but not limited to their rights to Medicare or Medicaid."*

*"Not request or require oral or written assurance that residents or potential residents are not eligible for, or will not apply for, Medicare or Medicaid benefits."*

# Medicaid Discrimination

- *Potential **Loophole***: deny admission without asking resident to forgo Medicaid.
  - Clear violation of the intent of the law.
  - Possibly satisfies the letter of the law.
- No good caselaw.
  - Lack of awareness.
  - Lack of representation.
  - Facilities back down when challenged.

# A Role for Advocates

- My research shows these problems are prevalent, but that's not enough.
- Lawmakers and regulators need to do more.
  - Regulators need to take a *clear stance*.
    - Little case law, and HHS OCR, MACPAC, etc., won't advise on the record.
  - Ombudsmen: "Not really on our radar." and "I wouldn't even know what box to check."
  - HHS survey (1999): only 4% of Medicaid officials think financial screening happens with any frequency (70% of discharge planners)






# Study Overview

- **Data:** All residents admitted to CA nursing homes between 2004 and 2007.
  - Assessments, claims, enrollment
- **Key challenge:** We don't see applications or know where residents wish they could have gone.
  - How do we prove there's discrimination?
  - Residents on Medicaid and with disabilities live in different geographic areas and *may even have different preferences.*

# Identifying Discrimination

- **Idea:** Look for patterns consistent with strategic discrimination.
  - Smart facilities will discriminate more when fewer beds are available.
  - Study identifies discrimination based on this.
- **Discrimination Test:** Do the *same facilities* admit different patients depending on how full they are?


# Simple Evidence



# Machine Learning

- **Challenge:** Residents have many characteristics: payment source, care needs, race, gender, age, etc.
- **Idea:** Ask a computer to “learn” from the data who is discriminated against based on what types of patients are typically admitted when less full.

# Discrimination "Points"



# Modeling and Policy Analysis

- **Idea:** statistically fit an economic model of residents' preferences over facilities and facilities' preferences over residents.
  - Common in economics research (especially competition/antitrust).
  - Now common in industry (Amazon, Uber, etc., all have teams that do this).
- **Value:**
  - Precise measurement of the problem.
  - Simulate alternative regulation and policy.

# Measuring the Problem

- 19% are not at their first-choice facility.
  - Higher for very long-stay Medicaid (49%)
- Medicaid beneficiaries would gain a lot of value from better access.
- Medicaid beneficiaries do care 35% less about RN staffing.
  - Though, they care much more than naïve approaches would infer.

# Alternative Policies

- **First come, first served**
  - Large benefits to Medicaid residents: \$10.09/day
  - Small harms to short-stay Medicare patients
- **Raising Medicaid reimbursements**
  - Matching private-pay costs \$37.26 per Medicaid day and is valued at \$0.72.
  - Access alone isn't worth it. (Need improvement.)
- **Expanding Capacity**
  - Benefits both Medicaid and non-Medicaid patients and benefits can exceed costs.
    - San Diego (+800 beds): \$11,544/day cost, \$27,384/day benefit




# Nursing Home Staff Turnover

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
# Staff Turnover is Really High








# Turnover Greater than 100%?!?!

- **Our measure:** fraction of care-hours that turn over during a year.
- *100% doesn't mean everyone left!*
- Same role can turn over multiple times.
- Most facilities have a mix of “permanent” and short-term staff. Short-term staff turn over *a lot*.

# High Turnover is a Bad Sign



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# High Turnover is a Bad Sign

- Turnover is associated with lots of indicators for concern:
  - High Medicaid utilization
  - Low income
  - For profit
  - Chain owned
- Mounting evidence that turnover causes worse outcomes.
  - More infection control violations after turnover
  - More evidence to come!

# High Turnover Made Headlines

- Thanks to great reporting, our work on high turnover made headlines and even got cited in Congressional hearings.
- But this shouldn't have been news.
  - ACA mandated that CMS publish turnover/retention measures
  - CMS just ignored this requirement
  - HHS OIG published a report urging CMS to report turnover just weeks after our paper.

# Success! Turnover Is Now On Nursing Home Compare

**Total nursing staff turnover**

↓ *Lower numbers are better*

**59.1%**

National average: 51.6%

California average: 44.3%

**Registered Nurse turnover**

↓ *Lower numbers are better*

**76.5%**

National average: 49.8%

California average: 49%

**Number of administrators who have left the nursing home**

↓ *Lower numbers are better*

**3**

National average: 1.1

California average: 0.8



# Changing the Ways We Measure and Reward Staffing

- As we learn more, it's worth asking:
  - Is hours per patient day the right measure?
  - What are the indicators of good staff?
  - Does a consistent care team help residents?
  - Can we reward high quality staffing and not just staffing levels?
- CMS is including turnover in star ratings.
- States may do even more:
  - Multiple state health departments have reached out about our research.
  - One is considering adjusting reimbursements based on staffing tenure.

# Thanks!

Don't hesitate to reach out.

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